From: Léo Le Bouter <lle-bout@zaclys.net>
To: bug-guix@gnu.org
Subject: curl is vulnerable to CVE-2021-22890 and CVE-2021-22876
Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2021 16:04:31 +0200
Report forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 14:05:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Acknowledgement sent
to Léo Le Bouter <lle-bout@zaclys.net>:
New bug report received and forwarded. Copy sent to bug-guix@gnu.org.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 14:05:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #5 received at submit@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
[Message part 1 (text/plain, inline)]
CVE-2021-22890 01.04.21 20:15 curl 7.63.0 to and including 7.75.0 includes vulnerability that allows a malicious HTTPS proxy to MITM a connection due to bad handling of TLS 1.3 session tickets. When using a HTTPS proxy and TLS 1.3, libcurl can confuse session tickets arriving from the HTTPS proxy but work as if they arrived from the remote server and then wrongly "short-cut" the host handshake. When confusing the tickets, a HTTPS proxy can trick libcurl to use the wrong session ticket resume for the host and thereby circumvent the server TLS certificate check and make a MITM attack to be possible to perform unnoticed. Note that such a malicious HTTPS proxy needs to provide a certificate that curl will accept for the MITMed server for an attack to work - unless curl has been told to ignore the server certificate check. CVE-2021-22876 01.04.21 20:15 curl 7.1.1 to and including 7.75.0 is vulnerable to an "Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor" by leaking credentials in the HTTP Referer: header. libcurl does not strip off user credentials from the URL when automatically populating the Referer: HTTP request header field in outgoing HTTP requests, and therefore risks leaking sensitive data to the server that is the target of the second HTTP request. A WIP patch will follow, please help finishing it (rebase curl-CVE- 2021-22890.patch on 7.74.0).
[signature.asc (application/pgp-signature, inline)]
Added tag(s) security.
Request was from Léo Le Bouter <lle-bout@zaclys.net>
to control@debbugs.gnu.org.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 14:06:01 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 14:10:01 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #10 received at 47563@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch was rebased onto 7.74.0, but curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch does not apply and please I need help rebasing it, it looks quite complex. I pushed an upgrade of curl to 7.76.0 which has been much much easier to core-updates already as https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/commit/?h=core-updates&id=2e0b1b62e94b926041ca9af70537dd9b3ab64edf but unfortunately since curl requires so many rebuilds it seems we can't use such commit on master for now. Léo Le Bouter (1): gnu: curl: Fix CVE-2021-22876 and CVE-2021-22890. gnu/local.mk | 2 + gnu/packages/curl.scm | 4 +- .../patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch | 147 ++++++ .../patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch | 499 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 651 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch -- 2.31.1
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 14:10:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #13 received at 47563@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
* gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch: New patches.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register them.
* gnu/packages/curl.scm (curl): Apply patches.
---
gnu/local.mk | 2 +
gnu/packages/curl.scm | 4 +-
.../patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch | 147 ++++++
.../patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch | 499 ++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 651 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index f2d595f2cc..cf6f35363f 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -919,6 +919,8 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/crda-optional-gcrypt.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/clucene-contribs-lib.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cube-nocheck.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/curl-use-ssl-cert-env.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cursynth-wave-rand.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cvs-CVE-2017-12836.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/curl.scm b/gnu/packages/curl.scm
index 730676875c..fa02f281cf 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/curl.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/curl.scm
@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@
(sha256
(base32
"12w7gskrglg6qrmp822j37fmbr0icrcxv7rib1fy5xiw80n5z7cr"))
- (patches (search-patches "curl-use-ssl-cert-env.patch"))))
+ (patches (search-patches "curl-use-ssl-cert-env.patch"
+ "curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch"
+ "curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch"))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(outputs '("out"
"doc")) ;1.2 MiB of man3 pages
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b67a1be16a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+From 7214288898f5625a6cc196e22a74232eada7861c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Viktor Szakats <commit@vsz.me>
+Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 14:54:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] transfer: strip credentials from the auto-referer header
+ field
+
+Added test 2081 to verify.
+
+CVE-2021-22876
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22876.html
+---
+ lib/transfer.c | 25 ++++++++++++++--
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc | 2 +-
+ tests/data/test2081 | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test2081
+
+diff --git a/lib/transfer.c b/lib/transfer.c
+index 1976bc0338bc..a68c021c84d6 100644
+--- a/lib/transfer.c
++++ b/lib/transfer.c
+@@ -1581,6 +1581,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ data->state.followlocation++; /* count location-followers */
+
+ if(data->set.http_auto_referer) {
++ CURLU *u;
++ char *referer;
++
+ /* We are asked to automatically set the previous URL as the referer
+ when we get the next URL. We pick the ->url field, which may or may
+ not be 100% correct */
+@@ -1590,9 +1593,27 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;
+ }
+
+- data->change.referer = strdup(data->change.url);
+- if(!data->change.referer)
++ /* Make a copy of the URL without crenditals and fragment */
++ u = curl_url();
++ if(!u)
++ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++
++ uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_URL, data->change.url, 0);
++ if(!uc)
++ uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_FRAGMENT, NULL, 0);
++ if(!uc)
++ uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_USER, NULL, 0);
++ if(!uc)
++ uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
++ if(!uc)
++ uc = curl_url_get(u, CURLUPART_URL, &referer, 0);
++
++ curl_url_cleanup(u);
++
++ if(uc || referer == NULL)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++
++ data->change.referer = referer;
+ data->change.referer_alloc = TRUE; /* yes, free this later */
+ }
+ }
+diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+index 2c7a0ca89fd8..ea52683d2254 100644
+--- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
++++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ test2064 test2065 test2066 test2067 test2068 test2069 \
+ test2064 test2065 test2066 test2067 test2068 test2069 test2070 \
+ test2071 test2072 test2073 test2074 test2075 test2076 test2077 \
+ test2078 \
+-test2080 \
++test2080 test2081 \
+ test2100 \
+ \
+ test3000 test3001 test3002 test3003 test3004 test3005 test3006 test3007 \
+diff --git a/tests/data/test2081 b/tests/data/test2081
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..a6733e737beb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test2081
+@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++HTTP
++HTTP GET
++referer
++followlocation
++--write-out
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<data nocheck="yes">
++HTTP/1.1 301 This is a weirdo text message swsclose
++Location: data/%TESTNUMBER0002.txt?coolsite=yes
++Content-Length: 62
++Connection: close
++
++This server reply is for testing a simple Location: following
++</data>
++</reply>
++
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<server>
++http
++</server>
++ <name>
++Automatic referrer credential and anchor stripping check
++ </name>
++ <command>
++http://user:pass@%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT/we/want/our/%TESTNUMBER#anchor --location --referer ';auto' --write-out '%{referer}\n'
++</command>
++</client>
++
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++<errorcode>
++52
++</errorcode>
++<protocol>
++GET /we/want/our/%TESTNUMBER HTTP/1.1
++Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
++Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz
++User-Agent: curl/%VERSION
++Accept: */*
++
++GET /we/want/our/data/%TESTNUMBER0002.txt?coolsite=yes HTTP/1.1
++Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
++Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz
++User-Agent: curl/%VERSION
++Accept: */*
++Referer: http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT/we/want/our/%TESTNUMBER
++
++</protocol>
++<stdout>
++HTTP/1.1 301 This is a weirdo text message swsclose
++Location: data/%TESTNUMBER0002.txt?coolsite=yes
++Content-Length: 62
++Connection: close
++
++http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT/we/want/our/%TESTNUMBER
++</stdout>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f01bc20530
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+From b09c8ee15771c614c4bf3ddac893cdb12187c844 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 12:38:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] vtls: add 'isproxy' argument to Curl_ssl_get/addsessionid()
+
+To make sure we set and extract the correct session.
+
+Reported-by: Mingtao Yang
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22890.html
+
+CVE-2021-22890
+---
+ lib/vtls/bearssl.c | 8 +++++--
+ lib/vtls/gtls.c | 12 ++++++----
+ lib/vtls/mbedtls.c | 12 ++++++----
+ lib/vtls/mesalink.c | 14 ++++++++----
+ lib/vtls/openssl.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ lib/vtls/schannel.c | 10 ++++----
+ lib/vtls/sectransp.c | 10 ++++----
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c | 12 +++++++---
+ lib/vtls/vtls.h | 2 ++
+ lib/vtls/wolfssl.c | 13 +++++++----
+ 10 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/bearssl.c b/lib/vtls/bearssl.c
+index 36c32d8d55be..39fc1a29209c 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/bearssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/bearssl.c
+@@ -375,7 +375,8 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ void *session;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &session, NULL, sockindex)) {
++ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++ &session, NULL, sockindex)) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_session_parameters(&backend->ctx.eng, session);
+ infof(data, "BearSSL: re-using session ID\n");
+ }
+@@ -571,10 +572,13 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ br_ssl_engine_get_session_parameters(&backend->ctx.eng, session);
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
+ &oldsession, NULL, sockindex));
+ if(incache)
+ Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, oldsession);
+- ret = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, session, 0, sockindex);
++ ret = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++ session, 0, sockindex);
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ if(ret) {
+ free(session);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+index a75937b4646c..3b0d940a60e1 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+@@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
+ &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize, sockindex)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ gnutls_session_set_data(session, ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize);
+@@ -1286,8 +1287,9 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize);
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL,
+- sockindex));
++ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++ &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex));
+ if(incache) {
+ /* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the
+ previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */
+@@ -1295,8 +1297,10 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ }
+
+ /* store this session id */
+- result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, connect_sessionid,
+- connect_idsize, sockindex);
++ result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++ connect_sessionid, connect_idsize,
++ sockindex);
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ if(result) {
+ free(connect_sessionid);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
+index 95cd4d99b665..93a7ac1fd87d 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
+@@ -463,7 +463,9 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ void *old_session = NULL;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &old_session, NULL, sockindex)) {
++ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++ &old_session, NULL, sockindex)) {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&backend->ssl, old_session);
+ if(ret) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+@@ -724,6 +726,7 @@ mbed_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *our_ssl_sessionid;
+ void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
++ bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE;
+
+ our_ssl_sessionid = malloc(sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session));
+ if(!our_ssl_sessionid)
+@@ -742,11 +745,12 @@ mbed_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+
+ /* If there's already a matching session in the cache, delete it */
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex))
++ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL,
++ sockindex))
+ Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid);
+
+- retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn,
+- our_ssl_sessionid, 0, sockindex);
++ retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, our_ssl_sessionid,
++ 0, sockindex);
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ if(retcode) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(our_ssl_sessionid);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/mesalink.c b/lib/vtls/mesalink.c
+index 4f1ab8627f49..5d6a1495d790 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/mesalink.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/mesalink.c
+@@ -261,7 +261,9 @@ mesalink_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
++ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++ &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ if(!SSL_set_session(BACKEND->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+@@ -345,13 +347,14 @@ mesalink_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+ bool incache;
+ SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid;
+ void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
++ bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE;
+
+ our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(BACKEND->handle);
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+ incache =
+- !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn,
+- &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex));
++ !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL,
++ sockindex));
+ if(incache) {
+ if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
+ infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+@@ -361,8 +364,9 @@ mesalink_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+ }
+
+ if(!incache) {
+- result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(
+- data, conn, our_ssl_sessionid, 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex);
++ result =
++ Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, our_ssl_sessionid, 0,
++ sockindex);
+ if(result) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+index 498f8b9d1d08..68b98984b460 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+@@ -393,12 +393,23 @@ static int ossl_get_ssl_conn_index(void)
+ */
+ static int ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index(void)
+ {
+- static int ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index = -1;
+- if(ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index < 0) {
+- ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+- NULL);
++ static int sockindex_index = -1;
++ if(sockindex_index < 0) {
++ sockindex_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+- return ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index;
++ return sockindex_index;
++}
++
++/* Return an extra data index for proxy boolean.
++ * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
++ */
++static int ossl_get_proxy_index(void)
++{
++ static int proxy_index = -1;
++ if(proxy_index < 0) {
++ proxy_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ }
++ return proxy_index;
+ }
+
+ static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting,
+@@ -1174,7 +1185,7 @@ static int ossl_init(void)
+
+ /* Initialize the extra data indexes */
+ if(ossl_get_ssl_data_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_conn_index() < 0 ||
+- ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0)
++ ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0 || ossl_get_proxy_index() < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+@@ -2432,8 +2443,10 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
+ int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
+ int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
+ int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
++ int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
++ bool isproxy;
+
+- if(data_idx < 0 || connectdata_idx < 0 || sockindex_idx < 0)
++ if(data_idx < 0 || connectdata_idx < 0 || sockindex_idx < 0 || proxy_idx < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ conn = (struct connectdata*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, connectdata_idx);
+@@ -2446,13 +2459,18 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
+ sockindex_ptr = (curl_socket_t*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, sockindex_idx);
+ sockindex = (int)(sockindex_ptr - conn->sock);
+
++ isproxy = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, proxy_idx) ? TRUE : FALSE;
++
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
+ bool incache;
+ void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL,
+- sockindex));
++ if(isproxy)
++ incache = FALSE;
++ else
++ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, isproxy,
++ &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex));
+ if(incache) {
+ if(old_ssl_sessionid != ssl_sessionid) {
+ infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+@@ -2462,8 +2480,8 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
+ }
+
+ if(!incache) {
+- if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, ssl_sessionid,
+- 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex)) {
++ if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, ssl_sessionid,
++ 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex)) {
+ /* the session has been put into the session cache */
+ res = 1;
+ }
+@@ -3193,17 +3211,27 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
+ int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
+ int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
++ int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
+
+- if(data_idx >= 0 && connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0) {
++ if(data_idx >= 0 && connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0 &&
++ proxy_idx >= 0) {
+ /* Store the data needed for the "new session" callback.
+ * The sockindex is stored as a pointer to an array element. */
+ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, data_idx, data);
+ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, connectdata_idx, conn);
+ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, sockindex_idx, conn->sock + sockindex);
++#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
++ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? (void *) 1:
++ NULL);
++#else
++ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx, NULL);
++#endif
++
+ }
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
++ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++ &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/schannel.c b/lib/vtls/schannel.c
+index d7b89d43f892..931bd853eb8e 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/schannel.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/schannel.c
+@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
+ (void **)&old_cred, NULL, sockindex)) {
+ BACKEND->cred = old_cred;
+ DEBUGF(infof(data, "schannel: re-using existing credential handle\n"));
+@@ -1337,8 +1338,9 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ SECURITY_STATUS sspi_status = SEC_E_OK;
+ CERT_CONTEXT *ccert_context = NULL;
++ bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY();
+ #ifdef DEBUGBUILD
+- const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
++ const char * const hostname = isproxy ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+ conn->host.name;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef HAS_ALPN
+@@ -1414,8 +1416,8 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ struct Curl_schannel_cred *old_cred = NULL;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, (void **)&old_cred, NULL,
+- sockindex));
++ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, (void **)&old_cred,
++ NULL, sockindex));
+ if(incache) {
+ if(old_cred != BACKEND->cred) {
+ DEBUGF(infof(data,
+@@ -1426,7 +1428,7 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ }
+ }
+ if(!incache) {
+- result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, (void *)BACKEND->cred,
++ result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, BACKEND->cred,
+ sizeof(struct Curl_schannel_cred),
+ sockindex);
+ if(result) {
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/sectransp.c b/lib/vtls/sectransp.c
+index 05b57dfaad91..e69b99b72cd6 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/sectransp.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/sectransp.c
+@@ -1400,10 +1400,12 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert);
+ const struct curl_blob *ssl_cert_blob = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.cert_blob);
+ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
+- const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
++ bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY();
++ const char * const hostname = isproxy ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+ conn->host.name;
+ const long int port = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->port : conn->remote_port;
+ #else
++ const isproxy = FALSE;
+ const char * const hostname = conn->host.name;
+ const long int port = conn->remote_port;
+ #endif
+@@ -1613,7 +1615,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ #ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(data->state.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2
+ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
+- && (!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)
++ && (!isproxy || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)
+ #endif
+ ) {
+ CFArrayAppendValue(alpnArr, CFSTR(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID));
+@@ -1953,7 +1955,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ size_t ssl_sessionid_len;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, (void **)&ssl_sessionid,
++ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, (void **)&ssl_sessionid,
+ &ssl_sessionid_len, sockindex)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ err = SSLSetPeerID(backend->ssl_ctx, ssl_sessionid, ssl_sessionid_len);
+@@ -1981,7 +1983,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, ssl_sessionid,
++ result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, ssl_sessionid,
+ ssl_sessionid_len, sockindex);
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ if(result) {
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index 6a0069237fdb..95fd6356285f 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ void Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ */
+ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct connectdata *conn,
++ const bool isProxy,
+ void **ssl_sessionid,
+ size_t *idsize, /* set 0 if unknown */
+ int sockindex)
+@@ -377,7 +378,6 @@ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ bool no_match = TRUE;
+
+ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
+- const bool isProxy = CONNECT_PROXY_SSL();
+ struct ssl_primary_config * const ssl_config = isProxy ?
+ &conn->proxy_ssl_config :
+ &conn->ssl_config;
+@@ -389,10 +389,15 @@ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct ssl_primary_config * const ssl_config = &conn->ssl_config;
+ const char * const name = conn->host.name;
+ int port = conn->remote_port;
+- (void)sockindex;
+ #endif
++ (void)sockindex;
+ *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+
++#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
++ if(isProxy)
++ return TRUE;
++#endif
++
+ DEBUGASSERT(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid));
+
+ if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid))
+@@ -480,6 +485,7 @@ void Curl_ssl_delsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data, void *ssl_sessionid)
+ */
+ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct connectdata *conn,
++ bool isProxy,
+ void *ssl_sessionid,
+ size_t idsize,
+ int sockindex)
+@@ -492,7 +498,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ int conn_to_port;
+ long *general_age;
+ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
+- const bool isProxy = CONNECT_PROXY_SSL();
+ struct ssl_primary_config * const ssl_config = isProxy ?
+ &conn->proxy_ssl_config :
+ &conn->ssl_config;
+@@ -505,6 +510,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ const char *hostname = conn->host.name;
+ (void)sockindex;
+ #endif
++ (void)sockindex;
+ DEBUGASSERT(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid));
+
+ clone_host = strdup(hostname);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.h b/lib/vtls/vtls.h
+index 273184f1894a..2b43e7744b19 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.h
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.h
+@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ void Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(struct Curl_easy *data);
+ */
+ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct connectdata *conn,
++ const bool isproxy,
+ void **ssl_sessionid,
+ size_t *idsize, /* set 0 if unknown */
+ int sockindex);
+@@ -245,6 +246,7 @@ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ */
+ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct connectdata *conn,
++ const bool isProxy,
+ void *ssl_sessionid,
+ size_t idsize,
+ int sockindex);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c b/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c
+index 7159ac9d5e64..8fb2ea7acf31 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c
+@@ -516,7 +516,9 @@ wolfssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
++ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn,
++ SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++ &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+ char error_buffer[WOLFSSL_MAX_ERROR_SZ];
+@@ -772,11 +774,12 @@ wolfssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ bool incache;
+ void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+ SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(backend->handle);
++ bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE;
+
+ if(our_ssl_sessionid) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+- incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL,
+- sockindex));
++ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, isproxy,
++ &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex));
+ if(incache) {
+ if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
+ infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+@@ -786,8 +789,8 @@ wolfssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ }
+
+ if(!incache) {
+- result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
+- 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex);
++ result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, our_ssl_sessionid,
++ 0, sockindex);
+ if(result) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
--
2.31.1
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 18:23:01 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #16 received at submit@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
On Fri, Apr 02, 2021 at 04:09:39PM +0200, Léo Le Bouter via Bug reports for GNU Guix wrote: > curl-CVE-2021-22876.patch was rebased onto 7.74.0, but curl-CVE-2021-22890.patch > does not apply and please I need help rebasing it, it looks quite complex. > > I pushed an upgrade of curl to 7.76.0 which has been much much easier to > core-updates already as > https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/commit/?h=core-updates&id=2e0b1b62e94b926041ca9af70537dd9b3ab64edf > but unfortunately since curl requires so many rebuilds it seems we can't use > such commit on master for now. Can we try grafting an "upgrade" to 7.76.0? In my experience, most curl upgrades are graftable. Curl's developers are very careful with their ABI and even maintain their own page on the subject: <https://curl.se/libcurl/abi.html>
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 18:23:01 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 18:45:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #22 received at submit@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
[Message part 1 (text/plain, inline)]
On Fri, 2021-04-02 at 14:22 -0400, Leo Famulari wrote: > > Can we try grafting an "upgrade" to 7.76.0? In my experience, most > curl > upgrades are graftable. > > Curl's developers are very careful with their ABI and even maintain > their own page on the subject: <https://curl.se/libcurl/abi.html> If you think that's OK, let's do it! I see indeed from that page there should be no problem. Will send a patch shortly.
[signature.asc (application/pgp-signature, inline)]
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 18:45:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 19:25:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #28 received at 47563@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
Fixes CVE-2021-22876 and CVE-2021-22890.
* gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch: New patch.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register it.
* gnu/packages/curl.scm (curl/fixed): New variable. Apply patch.
(curl)[replacement]: Graft.
---
gnu/local.mk | 1 +
gnu/packages/curl.scm | 14 ++++
.../patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch | 64 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 1a767a6c89..0d472072ae 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -920,6 +920,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/clucene-contribs-lib.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cube-nocheck.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/curl-use-ssl-cert-env.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cursynth-wave-rand.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cvs-CVE-2017-12836.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-ac-try-run-fix.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/curl.scm b/gnu/packages/curl.scm
index 730676875c..5608d556e7 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/curl.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/curl.scm
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
(base32
"12w7gskrglg6qrmp822j37fmbr0icrcxv7rib1fy5xiw80n5z7cr"))
(patches (search-patches "curl-use-ssl-cert-env.patch"))))
+ (replacement curl/fixed)
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(outputs '("out"
"doc")) ;1.2 MiB of man3 pages
@@ -151,6 +152,19 @@ tunneling, and so on.")
(name "curl-minimal")
(inputs (alist-delete "openldap" (package-inputs curl))))))
+(define-public curl/fixed
+ (package
+ (inherit curl)
+ (version "7.76.0")
+ (source
+ (origin
+ (inherit (package-source curl))
+ (uri (string-append "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-"
+ version ".tar.xz"))
+ (sha256
+ (base32
+ "1j2g04m6als6hmqzvddv84c31m0x90bfgyz3bjrwdkarbkby40k3"))))))
+
(define-public kurly
(package
(name "kurly")
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..24be6e31d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Make libcurl respect the SSL_CERT_{DIR,FILE} variables by default. The variables
+are fetched during initialization to preserve thread-safety (curl_global_init(3)
+must be called when no other threads exist).
+
+This fixes network functionality in rust:cargo, and probably removes the need
+for other future workarounds.
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.66.0.orig/lib/easy.c 2020-01-02 15:43:11.883921171 +0100
++++ curl-7.66.0/lib/easy.c 2020-01-02 16:18:54.691882797 +0100
+@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@
+ # pragma warning(default:4232) /* MSVC extension, dllimport identity */
+ #endif
+
++char * Curl_ssl_cert_dir = NULL;
++char * Curl_ssl_cert_file = NULL;
++
+ /**
+ * curl_global_init() globally initializes curl given a bitwise set of the
+ * different features of what to initialize.
+@@ -155,6 +158,9 @@
+ #endif
+ }
+
++ Curl_ssl_cert_dir = curl_getenv("SSL_CERT_DIR");
++ Curl_ssl_cert_file = curl_getenv("SSL_CERT_FILE");
++
+ if(!Curl_ssl_init()) {
+ DEBUGF(fprintf(stderr, "Error: Curl_ssl_init failed\n"));
+ return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+@@ -260,6 +266,9 @@
+ Curl_ssl_cleanup();
+ Curl_resolver_global_cleanup();
+
++ free(Curl_ssl_cert_dir);
++ free(Curl_ssl_cert_file);
++
+ #ifdef WIN32
+ Curl_win32_cleanup(init_flags);
+ #endif
+diff -ur curl-7.66.0.orig/lib/url.c curl-7.66.0/lib/url.c
+--- curl-7.66.0.orig/lib/url.c 2020-01-02 15:43:11.883921171 +0100
++++ curl-7.66.0/lib/url.c 2020-01-02 16:21:11.563880346 +0100
+@@ -524,6 +524,21 @@
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+ #endif
++ extern char * Curl_ssl_cert_dir;
++ extern char * Curl_ssl_cert_file;
++ if(Curl_ssl_cert_dir) {
++ if(result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH], Curl_ssl_cert_dir))
++ return result;
++ if(result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH_PROXY], Curl_ssl_cert_dir))
++ return result;
++ }
++
++ if(Curl_ssl_cert_file) {
++ if(result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE], Curl_ssl_cert_file))
++ return result;
++ if(result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_PROXY], Curl_ssl_cert_file))
++ return result;
++ }
+ }
+
+ set->wildcard_enabled = FALSE;
--
2.31.1
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 19:34:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #31 received at 47563@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
Fixes CVE-2021-22876 and CVE-2021-22890.
* gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch: New patch.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register it.
* gnu/packages/curl.scm (curl/fixed): New variable. Apply patch.
(curl)[replacement]: Graft.
---
gnu/local.mk | 1 +
gnu/packages/curl.scm | 15 +++++
.../patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch | 64 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 80 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 1a767a6c89..0d472072ae 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -920,6 +920,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/clucene-contribs-lib.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cube-nocheck.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/curl-use-ssl-cert-env.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cursynth-wave-rand.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cvs-CVE-2017-12836.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-ac-try-run-fix.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/curl.scm b/gnu/packages/curl.scm
index 730676875c..94dc51cfc5 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/curl.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/curl.scm
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
(base32
"12w7gskrglg6qrmp822j37fmbr0icrcxv7rib1fy5xiw80n5z7cr"))
(patches (search-patches "curl-use-ssl-cert-env.patch"))))
+ (replacement curl/fixed)
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(outputs '("out"
"doc")) ;1.2 MiB of man3 pages
@@ -151,6 +152,20 @@ tunneling, and so on.")
(name "curl-minimal")
(inputs (alist-delete "openldap" (package-inputs curl))))))
+(define-public curl/fixed
+ (package
+ (inherit curl)
+ (version "7.76.0")
+ (source
+ (origin
+ (inherit (package-source curl))
+ (uri (string-append "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-"
+ version ".tar.xz"))
+ (patches (search-patches "curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch"))
+ (sha256
+ (base32
+ "1j2g04m6als6hmqzvddv84c31m0x90bfgyz3bjrwdkarbkby40k3"))))))
+
(define-public kurly
(package
(name "kurly")
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..24be6e31d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Make libcurl respect the SSL_CERT_{DIR,FILE} variables by default. The variables
+are fetched during initialization to preserve thread-safety (curl_global_init(3)
+must be called when no other threads exist).
+
+This fixes network functionality in rust:cargo, and probably removes the need
+for other future workarounds.
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.66.0.orig/lib/easy.c 2020-01-02 15:43:11.883921171 +0100
++++ curl-7.66.0/lib/easy.c 2020-01-02 16:18:54.691882797 +0100
+@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@
+ # pragma warning(default:4232) /* MSVC extension, dllimport identity */
+ #endif
+
++char * Curl_ssl_cert_dir = NULL;
++char * Curl_ssl_cert_file = NULL;
++
+ /**
+ * curl_global_init() globally initializes curl given a bitwise set of the
+ * different features of what to initialize.
+@@ -155,6 +158,9 @@
+ #endif
+ }
+
++ Curl_ssl_cert_dir = curl_getenv("SSL_CERT_DIR");
++ Curl_ssl_cert_file = curl_getenv("SSL_CERT_FILE");
++
+ if(!Curl_ssl_init()) {
+ DEBUGF(fprintf(stderr, "Error: Curl_ssl_init failed\n"));
+ return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+@@ -260,6 +266,9 @@
+ Curl_ssl_cleanup();
+ Curl_resolver_global_cleanup();
+
++ free(Curl_ssl_cert_dir);
++ free(Curl_ssl_cert_file);
++
+ #ifdef WIN32
+ Curl_win32_cleanup(init_flags);
+ #endif
+diff -ur curl-7.66.0.orig/lib/url.c curl-7.66.0/lib/url.c
+--- curl-7.66.0.orig/lib/url.c 2020-01-02 15:43:11.883921171 +0100
++++ curl-7.66.0/lib/url.c 2020-01-02 16:21:11.563880346 +0100
+@@ -524,6 +524,21 @@
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+ #endif
++ extern char * Curl_ssl_cert_dir;
++ extern char * Curl_ssl_cert_file;
++ if(Curl_ssl_cert_dir) {
++ if(result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH], Curl_ssl_cert_dir))
++ return result;
++ if(result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH_PROXY], Curl_ssl_cert_dir))
++ return result;
++ }
++
++ if(Curl_ssl_cert_file) {
++ if(result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE], Curl_ssl_cert_file))
++ return result;
++ if(result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_PROXY], Curl_ssl_cert_file))
++ return result;
++ }
+ }
+
+ set->wildcard_enabled = FALSE;
--
2.31.1
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 19:35:01 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #34 received at 47563@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
[Message part 1 (text/plain, inline)]
To me, that last patch is ready to merge. Please push if you feel that's OK too, don't wait for me! Thanks!
[signature.asc (application/pgp-signature, inline)]
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 20:37:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #37 received at submit@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
[Message part 1 (text/plain, inline)]
On Fri, Apr 02, 2021 at 09:34:31PM +0200, Léo Le Bouter via Bug reports for GNU Guix wrote: > To me, that last patch is ready to merge. > > Please push if you feel that's OK too, don't wait for me! Building now to test...
[signature.asc (application/pgp-signature, inline)]
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 20:37:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Information forwarded
to bug-guix@gnu.org:
bug#47563; Package guix.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 20:47:01 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #43 received at submit@debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox, reply):
[Message part 1 (text/plain, inline)]
On Fri, Apr 02, 2021 at 09:33:02PM +0200, Léo Le Bouter via Bug reports for GNU Guix wrote: > Fixes CVE-2021-22876 and CVE-2021-22890. > > * gnu/packages/patches/curl-7.76-use-ssl-cert-env.patch: New patch. > * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register it. > * gnu/packages/curl.scm (curl/fixed): New variable. Apply patch. > (curl)[replacement]: Graft. I tweaked the commit message — committer's preference ;) — and pushed as f4dc8ac6dfa036d98aa0990ae22268a9650899d0. Thanks!
[signature.asc (application/pgp-signature, inline)]
Reply sent
to Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>:
You have taken responsibility.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 20:47:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Notification sent
to Léo Le Bouter <lle-bout@zaclys.net>:
bug acknowledged by developer.
(Fri, 02 Apr 2021 20:47:02 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
bug archived.
Request was from Debbugs Internal Request <help-debbugs@gnu.org>
to internal_control@debbugs.gnu.org.
(Sat, 01 May 2021 11:24:13 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
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