#22883 - Trustable "guix pull" - GNU bug report logs

Package	Source(s)		Maintainer(s)
guix		PTS Buildd Popcon

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From: Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
To: 22883@debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: Re: bug#22883: Authenticating a Git checkout
References: <87io14sqoa.fsf@dustycloud.org> <87h9ep8gxk.fsf@gnu.org>
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Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:23:00 +0200
In-Reply-To: <87wo5vfuxi.fsf@gnu.org> ("Ludovic
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Hello!

Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org> skribis:

> The list of authorized committers is meant to be stored in a
> ‘.guix-authorizations’ file in each branch of the channel.  It is
> essentially a list of fingerprints:
>
>   https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/commit/?h=wip-openpgp&id=f145a2d1a982cc841c7ccae3334d4783dad24a1e
>
> To accept a new committer, an authorized committer must add its key to
> this file in the branch(es) where that person is expected to commit.
> The format currently accepts additional data for each fingerprint.  It’s
> currently ignored, but I thought it could be useful in the future, for
> instance if we want to associate a file pattern with a key.
>
> A commit is considered “authorized” if and only if its signing key is
> listed in the ‘.guix-authorizations’ file of its parent commit(s).

The good news with this model is that an adversary cannot trick users
into fetching an unrelated branch where the authorizations would be
different: they can always detect that it’s a disconnected branch or
that it’s not a fast-forward pull.

The bad news is that this also prevents “unauthorized forks” in general.
Unless Guix folks explicitly push a commit authorizing the key of the
person who forks, commits by that person will appear as unauthorized.

So we need an extra mechanism to say: “this fork starts here”.  However,
modifications to that piece of information must be detectable so that
one cannot serve a malicious fork that pretends to forego history.

Ludo’.

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#22883 Trustable "guix pull"